



PIGS IN PLATO: 
DELINEATING THE HUMAN CONDITION 
IN THE STATESMAn
David Ambuel
“Many of Plato’s knavish speeches sleep in the unapprehending 
ears of his commentators.”
Paul Shorey
“In [The Celestial Empire of Benevolent Knowledge’s] remote pag-
es it is written that the animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the 
emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) 
fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classifcation, 
(i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fne camelhair 
brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) 
that from a long way off look like fies.”
Jorge Luis Borges
In the Republic, Socrates’ imagined primitive and modest community 
is dismissed by Glaucon as a city of pigs (II,372d). Despite Socrates’ 
belief that this frst city, not the luxurious city that will grow and be 
reformed into the Republic’s kallipolis, is the true city, some among 
us might just fnd with Glaucon that the city whose people seek to 
satisfy their appetites with luxuries is truer to actual human exist-
ence. And one might fnd this hunch confrmed by the Republic’s 
subsequent doubts about the possible existence even of the sustain-
able aristocracy ruled by philosopher guardians, not to mention the 
primitive harmony of the Socratic susopolis,1 and by Socrates’ re-
1 Piggish from Glaucon’s point of view, that is, not Socrates’.
it makes it possible to distinguish who really is a statesman and who 
only pretends to be it. When do the existing cities use “the written 
documents” (297d6) of the only correct constitution? When do their 
law-making assemblies chase “after the traces of the truest constitu-
tion” (301e4)? They do it when they ask which law the true states-
man would enact in this situation, i.e. which order serves best the end 
of the state. The true knowing statesman does not exist in this world, 
but we can answer the question about the end of political expertise 
and so know the norm according to which the existing states and their 
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ricide 2 It is ftting that Plato should choose to use an Eleatic voice 
to examine the very thing that Eleatic metaphysics excludes: the 
ontological intermediate as image and imitation. The intermediate 
remains the issue in the Statesman, now not primarily a metaphysical 
matter, but practical, not the possibility of an ontological intermedi-
ate between being and absolute not-being, but the possibility of the 
exercise of wisdom in human affairs, the intermediate between mere 
animality and divinity 
 The Sophist offers no methodology, no criteria for properly defn-
ing by division, but only a paradigm, which in the Sophist as in the 
Statesman means a trivial example taken as a model from which to 
abstract its application to something more complex and signifcant. 
A methodology for division, including rules for dividing properly, 
appears elsewhere, in the Phaedrus and Philebus. These rules, dis-
tilled, might be summarized as follows:
Collection and division are reverse procedures, collection preced-
ing or coordinated with division 3
Division must proceed according to actual kinds or forms, not hap-
hazard parts 4
Division by forms means dividing at the natural joints.5
2 Plato, Sophist, 241d. It might be argued that the Visitor is introduced as 
eks Eleas (216a), as hailing from Elea, not explicitly an Eleatic philosopher 
cast in a Parmenidean mold, and that we can hardly assume that any native 
of Elea inherits one defnite metaphysical system as a birthright. However, 
Socrates phrases the question about the sophist, statesman, and philoso-
pher as one about what people in that place, in Elea, believed (216d). More 
importantly, at 241d, by requesting that he not be taken for a parricide by 
seeking for a way to talk about not-being, the Visitor identifes himself as 
the intellectual offspring of Parmenides  It is simply not plausible to suppose 
that Plato’s choice of character for the main interlocutor of the Sophist and 
Statesman is random and without meaning for the interpretation of the two 
dialogs  
3 Plato, Phdr  266d.
4 Plato, Phdr  265e; cf. Philb  16d–e.
5 Plato, Phdr  265e.
mark that words always make a closer approach to truth than things 
and actions 
 Regardless which societal confguration we are more likely to be 
able to set foot in, the short passage in Republic II conveys a sense 
of ambivalence. Which group of humans are more accurately de-
scribed as living like pigs, the simple primitive city of restricted 
wants and resources, as Glaucon thinks, or the denizens of the fe-
verish city wallowing in excess, as Socrates implies?
 For the most part, in Plato, the beast as compared to the human 
represents a state of ignorance and a life governed by appetite as op-
posed to reason, and yet the question how we humans might best un-
derstand ourselves apart from our fellow animals is at times presented 
with ironic doubt  At Laches, 195d, the observation that knowledge 
comprising a virtue such as courage is not the kind of thing just any 
pig would know leads to the remark that, by lacking the potential 
for knowledge that humans possess, no animal can rightly be called 
courageous, not a pig and not even a lion. Still, Socrates adds the 
facetious qualifcation that perhaps lions or bears do command some 
deep well of wisdom, inaccessible to us humans. A similar ironic 
ambiguity as to just what sort of animal the human being is will 
frame the setting against which the Eleatic Visitor’s halting attempts 
to defne the statesman take shape.
 Before turning to the manner in which this defnition is pursued, 
and to what that might tell us, I wish briefy to visit one other thread 
woven into the fabric of the dialogue’s background.
 The Statesman’s inquiry begins, as the Sophist’s begins and ends, 
by making divisions. The Sophist’s divisions, like the frst divisions 
in the Statesman, are strict dichotomies. In the Sophist, negative def-
nitions predominate: at each step, what the sophist is, is separated 
from all else that he is not, the latter disjunct – its relation to the 
other still unestablished – is then dropped, and the division pro-
ceeds. As a method, it is the intellectual offspring of a philosopher 
nurtured and raised on Eleatic metaphysics, his logic of defnition in 
the Sophist limited to sorting is from is not, with no space for any-
thing in between, since anything that is at all, simply is. The image, 
as ontologically intermediate, will be the Eleatic Visitor’s biggest 
obstacle in the Sophist, and if he sees a need to rebel against Parme-
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an epistême, but the initial divisions turn quickly away from group-
ings of anything that might be called a kind of expertise, to instead 
separating off the humans as the subjects of governance. The ini-
tial divisions pursue not the art, but its object. The dialogue will 
of course return to ask how the art itself differs from kindred arts, 
but for the moment attention is directed to the subject upon with the 
art is practiced 
 Yet before this focus on defning the human subject, the very frst 
step in the division ventures a global division of knowledge. It is 
a portent: all knowledge (sumpasas epistêmas) is divided into prac-
tical and theoretical knowledge (tên men praktikên… tên de monon 
gnôstikên, 258e).8 It is a division that may appear the most natural 
among all that are still to come, and yet it cuts across the province 
of the art of politics as it will be understood later, that is, precisely as 
a kind of art possessing a knowledge that is brought to bear on prac-
tical affairs (peri tas prakseis epistêmona, 284c). It foreshadows an 
ambivalence that surfaces in the depiction of the human being when 
the art of rule is tied to the nature of the human subject, a matter that 
is ironically broached in the initial steps of division, leading to the 
Eleatic Visitor’s frst objection to procedure and the cosmic myth.
 The frst correction appears once the king’s dominion has been 
narrowed to herds (261e). By this point, then, the humans appear to 
be grouped with the sheep, cows, and pigs, rather than, say, the bees 
or dogs, who may be left with no spot in the Eleatic Visitor’s schema. 
The split between herds and individuals is suggestive, and yet this 
step in the Visitor’s division does not distinguish kinds of animals, 
since, as the example of the horse shows (261d), a given species 
could fnd itself cared for either under the art of rearing singly or the 
art of rearing herds, depending on whether the ruler in question is 
tending one animal or many 
 Here Young Socrates is rebuked for drawing what should appear 
to be one of the more natural divisions in this initial series, dis-
tinguishing human (anthrôpos) from animal (thêrion). The Eleatic 
Visitor’s objection voices one of the rules also stated in the Phae-
drus, that division must proceed according to kinds or forms, not 
8 All kinds of theoretical knowledge are ψίλαι τῶν πράξεων (258d) and 
result in no production of anything that did not previously exist.
Division by form is axiological, a dividing in accord with proper 
measure and relative value 6
While the Sophist supplies a paradigm, but no rules for division, and 
the Phaedrus rules, but no paradigm, the Statesman has both  Moreo-
ver, setting aside questions about the reverse procedure of collection, 
which does not occur and is not discussed in either the Sophist or 
Statesman, each of the remaining principles is invoked in the States-
man by the Eleatic Visitor.7 These rules are not, however, concen-
trated here in a single passage, as in the Phaedrus, but are introduced 
by the Visitor piecemeal, one at a time, as correctives to the divisions 
while they are being drawn. But the Statesman has more still  In ad-
dition, the Visitor advances principles for division that are incompat-
ible with the rules he gives that are also found in the Phaedrus  In 
this simultaneous assertion and rejection of the principles, it will be 
seen that the Eleatic diffculties from the Sophist, the diffculties in 
construing an intermediate between what is and what is not, extend 
into the Statesman, and make for a pervasive ambivalence that is 
refected in the Statesman’s sketch of the human condition.
I  Eidos, Meros, and Rational Animals
The Sophist begins with and follows divisions of varieties of technai – 
hunters, merchants of various kinds, athletes, educators. By so doing, 
it introduces an assumption that contradicts what Plato elsewhere 
repeatedly says about the sophist, namely, the assumption that the 
sophist has an art, a technê  Now in the Statesman, statecraft, its 
status as an art undisputed in Plato, is designated both a technê and 
6 Plato, Phdr  266a–b; Plato, Philb  66a–b, cf. 24c.
7 It is certainly conceivable that “division”, as a method, does not des-
ignate precisely the same method in different dialogues. (See M. Wedin, 
Collection and Division in the Phaedrus and Statesman, in: Philosophical 
Inquiry, 1990, pp. 1–27.) Nevertheless, the clear thematic links cannot be 
overlooked. The Statesman contains the division foreseen in the Sophist, 
likewise conducted by the Eleatic Visitor, who explicitly refers to the pre-
vious discussion and initially proceeds by divisions that follow a pattern 
remarkably similar to those of the Sophist. Unlike the Sophist, the Statesman 
offers corrections, criteria for proper division, which correspond to points 
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of producing (geneseôs tinos heneka, 261b) from all the rest, some 
sort of non-producing commanding, which is left both nameless and 
without example. These divisions are left a part of the analysis, intact 
and unquestioned.
 Moreover, for the moment, the Eleatic Visitor uses the form – part 
criterion not primarily to attack divisions that would separate a class 
from its logical complement, an “is” from an “is non-”, as the Bara-
barian illustration would lead us to believe, but rather to advance 
a claim about the relative sizes of the remaining divided parts: di-
vision, it is maintained, is ought to be a slice down the middle into 
halves, or as near to halves as possible (262b, 264e).
 Presented here as allied with the requirement to divide by forms, 
not just parts, the rule calling for division into halves is in fact in-
compatible with it  Later in the Statesman, the halves criterion will 
become a quasi-repudiated rule, both withdrawn and not withdrawn 
in two steps. The frst of the two is mainly implicit, appearing with 
the introduction of the metrion, the concept that the due measure, 
not relative measure, is intrinsic to all proper division (284a). This 
is a retraction of the halves criterion by implication, since the rule to 
divide smack down the middle, though not expressly pointed out as 
such, is evidently a type of relative and purely quantitative measuring 
by more and less, not a measuring against a separate standard. The 
second is the more explicit semi-retraction. When, after the weaving 
paradigm and introduction of the principle of due measure, the dis-
tinction of statecraft from kindred arts resumes, the Visitor observes 
that, since it is not always possible to divide by halves, one should 
then divide at the joints, as if dividing a sacrifcial animal (kata melê 
toinun autas hoion hieron diairômetha, 287c). The Visitor is quite 
tentative here about this qualifcation, saying only that the reason will 
become clear as they proceed (to d’ aition, hôs oimai, proiousin ouch 
hêtton estai kataphanes, 287b–c), just as he had balked at Young 
Socrates’ request for a fuller explanation of the form – part dis-
tinction (263a). The Visitor evidently still at the later stage wishes 
to accord priority to clean and even dichotomies, although it has 
become apparent that the form – part rule conficts with the halves 
rule to which it was initially so closely tied. So it is not explicitly 
acknowledged that division as if at natural joints, and division by 
forms, merge as one. Indeed, in the Phaedrus, division into equal 
halves is not among the desiderata for good dividing, while division 
just parts, eidê, not merê. The Visitor does not deny that the human 
being is a genuine kind; he calls humans a genos at 262d, and the 
corrected division will also lead to the isolation of the human herd  
So the immediate implication is that thêrion does not constitute a real 
kind, and the Visitor’s injunction forbids negative defnition. But the 
Eleatic Visitor does more than this, for he rejects what he takes to 
be Young Socrates’ implied criterion in making the division as he 
did, and by this the Visitor supplies a reason why there are not yet 
grounds to identify humankind as a kind: there may be other rational 
animals (ei pou fronimon esti ti zoon heteron… 263d) ones able to 
name things, perhaps the crane. And so, in the name of dividing by 
forms or kinds and not by arbitrary parts, the human being cannot be 
distinguished as a rational animal 9
 Apart from this ironic result, the introduction of the form-part 
rule is curious in two other respects. The Eleatic Visitor illustrates 
the fault he fnds in Young Socrates’ suggestion by comparing it to 
the chauvinistic division of humans into Greeks and Barbarians. In-
sofar, the Visitor is rejecting negative defnitions. We do not make 
any advance in insight by opposing a recognized kind to an unlim-
ited otherness that it is not, and yet this very kind of diaeresis by 
negative defnition – the type of division that prevailed in the Soph-
ist – also most closely resembles, not Young Socrates’ distinction 
between humans and wild animals, but rather a number of the Eleatic 
Visitor’s own earlier and subsequent divisions, such as the distinc-
tion of those who practice the giving of their own orders (autepi-
taktikê, 260e) from all remaining communicators of orders, includ-
ing heralds, prophets, boatswains and others, all of them members 
of a nameless grouping, and the division of orders given for the sake 
9 Michel Fattal (On Division in Plato’s Statesman, in: Polis, 12, 1993, 
pp. 64– 76) argues for the presence in the dialogs of three distinct types 
of division, which he terms 1) “unregulated division” arousing “irony and 
joke,” 2) “division based on median dichotomies,” which is provisional and 
inexact, and 3) “division as exact as possible”, an ideal after which Plato 
strives. The three, for Fattal, are evidence of Plato’s attempt to continual 
revise and perfect. Here, however, near the beginning of the investigations 
of the Statesman, we fnd irony, dichotomy, and its (ironic) repudiation 
juxtaposed, which suggests much rather that 1) serves to illuminate 2) as 
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II. Bipedal Pigs Then and Now
The frst correction to division was employed to rule out a division 
of humans from animals, complete with a warning not to be overly 
hasty and take shortcuts. (It marks the beginning of much toying with 
notions of length and brevity in the dialogue.) The division is seen 
through by following along alternate “longer” and “shorter” paths, 
though the two differ in length only by a single step  (Resuming at 
264d from the tending of herds, agelaiatrophia, the two paths use 
fve further steps and four further steps respectively.)
 The longer road shows the human herd to be closest in nature to 
our cousins the pigs, sturdiest and most slovenly of creatures; the 
shorter concludes with the human as the prosaic featherless biped  
The introduction of the corrective that we must divide by true forms, 
not haphazard parts, has issued in a frst paradoxical determination 
of the human estate: fundamentally we are not rational animals, but 
rather featherless bipeds, half of our closest four-footed relatives, the 
pigs. In other words, the Eleatic Visitor in effect not only dismisses 
the contrast between humans and other animals, but assimilates hu-
mans to other animals 
 Further correctives to division are forthcoming, but the initial 
division will still stand. It is never rejected, simply recognized as 
not yet complete, since it has failed to differentiate the kingly art 
from other arts that also tend to the well-being of the human herd  
The next correction to the path of division comes not in the form 
of a principle, but a story. The myth does not illustrate how division 
to this point was incomplete – that was already stated succinctly 
and straightforwardly. Rather, it provides a way to conceive of the 
preceding division down to the bipedal pig (or featherless biped), 
as having pinpointed the kingly art more accurately and completely 
than it has seemed, namely, if it describes not today’s humans, but 
humans of a different cosmic epoch. Ultimately, that means it will 
describe both: past humans, insofar as it is stated that the division 
pertains more to rule under Kronos than to the forms of rule existing 
at present; also it remains equally applicable to the present age, since 
the division is not replaced, but resumed and completed. In other 
words, it represents that complete division for the age of Kronos, and 
the frst part of the complete division for the age of Zeus. With the 
myths, then, the human condition becomes two, though importantly 
by form and division at natural joints are identifed. The Statesman’s 
two rules, separated by some 25 Stephaus pages, are presented as 
synonymous in the Phaedrus: division should proceed by ability to 
divide by form along natural joints, not by attempting to break off 
just any part, like a bad butcher (to palin kat’ eidê dunasthai temnein, 
kat’ arthra, hê pephuke’ kai mê epitheirein katagnunai meros mêden, 
kakou mageirou tropô chrômenon, Phaedrus 265e).
 Whether a process that could be called division by form could 
come close to dichotomy, would depend to some extent on the na-
ture of the object of division. If it is an organic whole, the articu-
lated body of an animal, for example, then there is most likely no 
halving that does not violate the principle of dividing by joints. If 
we are dividing instead a given set of discrete individuals, it may 
be a different matter. Then, dividing by half would be simply a me-
chanical procedure: assign each member a number, and separate even 
from odd. The Eleatic Visitor in fact always appeals to some other 
property, indicating that it is not meant to be mechanical, however 
odd some of his properties may be. Again, whether that yields equal 
halves or not would depend on the distribution of the property in the 
set. In a given group of people, division into male and female, or over 
50 and under 50, or anything else may or may not lead to roughly 
equal subsets. What sort of property should count as one that deter-
mines a form or kind, is another question yet, and on that matter the 
Eleatic Visitor remains silent.
 One might wonder, though I would not want to insist on it, wheth-
er the Eleatic Visitor himself is confused, or whether with cunning 
and cleverness he is testing us, as Socrates suggested at the begin-
ning of the Sophist. Perhaps we need not know. The Visitor is tell-
ing Young Socrates that he must divide kat’ eidê but will not tell 
him how to do it, and will not properly do it himself, yet that does 
not prevent him from leading the boy through a rugged dialectical 
training exercise. And just maybe, we are meant to make out shades 
of Parmenides himself, frst telling the former Young Socrates that he 
should not be so quick to dismiss forms of mud and fngernails, not 
thereby implying that there are such forms, but rather that Socrates 
was too hasty in rejecting them for the wrong reasons, before going 
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to understand the art of statesmanship that we see played out in later 
passages 
III  Measuring the Yarn
The so-called lesser problem, distinguishing the king’s art from other 
arts, will in fact turn out to be the more intractable one, and it will be 
attacked in two ways that, while not presented as such, stand in con-
fict much like the form – part rule with the halves rule. As before, it 
is a matter of two procedural principles, one that can also be located 
in the Phaedrus and the Philebus, and one that cannot. These are the 
procedures for employing a paradigm (consequent upon an underly-
ing principle of value-neutrality), and for measuring with reference 
to due measure, not only relative measure.
 The paradigm of weaving will be used as the key for the Eleatic 
Visitor’s fnal differentiation of the arts in order to separate the king’s 
art. If not an explicit rule or criterion,10 the Visitor’s justifcation 
of the paradigm dictates that one should frst examine a simple and 
trivial matter that is accessible to the senses, then apply it as a model 
for the more complex and nuanced reality that has no visual image 
but can be examined only by reason (285e–286a).11 This model for 
using models implies a reversal of Platonic epistemology as found 
in other dialogues, notably the Republic; the impoverished image 
explains the reality. This aspect of the Visitor’s procedure extends 
beyond one paradigm: notably, the Visitor’s chosen ordering of their 
conversations – frst Sophist, then Statesman, then, if they get around 
to it, Philosopher – refects exactly the same reversal. If the sophist 
is a deceptive imitation of the statesman or of the philosopher, one 
might expect him to be treated last, since we must frst understand 
what it is he imitates, before we can truly understand his nature as 
a mere imitation. We cave dwellers are being asked, as it were, to 
fnd reality in the shadows, without making the ascent. Of course, 
the Eleatic Visitor does also justify the paradigm exercises as “prac-
10 It will be seen below that the paradigm in effect is the application of an 
explicit rule.
11 Thus, the Visitor’s words speak paradoxically of making the paradigm 
a visual image for that which has no visual image 
related: that of the archaic featherless biped and of the present day 
featherless biped. Whatever the biological factors that separate the 
two human herds, those differences ground differences that are more 
properly social and cultural, rather than differences in nature.
 Living under Kronos is, in at least one way, an idyll: there is 
no want, no war, no hunger or cold, no need to farm, to work, and 
most notably, no need to organize politically (politeiai te ouk êsan, 
271e). The kinship with other animals is even tighter than jokingly 
expressed previously through the divisions, since the humans under 
Kronos converse with the other animals (272b). What sort of logoi 
and whether these are the communications of pigs, cows, lions, and 
others endowed with speech and reason, or of humans deprived of it, 
is not known, and the happiness of life under Kronos, according to 
the Visitor, and whether it is better or worse than our present life, 
depends on whether they spend time with philosophy, or entirely 
with food and drink (272d).
 One lesson drawn from the myths concludes that they have made 
one large and one minor error. The large error was to confuse the 
earthly king with the divine shepherd. The smaller, mentioned also 
prior to the myths, was the failure to separate the king from other 
contenders for the title of caretaker of the human herd. This also 
explains why the division can be portrayed as complete for the age 
of Kronos: under Kronos, there are no human caretakers at all, only 
governance by god, with no division of labor and no multiple arts, 
each its own area of expertise with its own specialists. As the Eleatic 
Visitor develops the argument, however, the errors prove to be con-
nected, two facets of a single issue, rather than separate questions. 
We can say this, because the Visitor goes on to claim that the initial 
divisions, rather than describing the divine shepherd instead of the 
human ruler, can in fact be taken to describe both, and the confu-
sion of the two stems from the incompleteness. Presumably, under 
Kronos, with no farming, building, weaving, warring or other fa-
miliar human activities going on, there are no arts to compete with 
whatever it is that rule does. For the age of Kronos, the division is 
complete; for the present age with its human rulers closer in nature 
and upbringing to their human subjects (275c), it must proceed. It is 
left tantalizingly ambiguous, just how different the two rulers are or 
are not, and how different, in the end, are the subjects. The images 
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measure quantities in relation to their opposites and arts that measure 
in relation to a standard of what is due and ftting (284e).12
 In the subsequent discussion, appeal to the weaving paradigm is 
explicit and extensive, while reference to the principle of due meas-
ure more subtle. The two principles underlie a tension in the descrip-
tion of the political art, which, in turn, relates back to a theme from 
the beginning, namely, our understanding of the human condition: 
is rationality our very essence, or are we two-legged pigs, are we 
rational and animal, or are we just animal? That these two princi-
ples are in a way incompatible is not so apparent as was the confict 
between the form – part principle and the halves principle, and to 
show it, we must take up another repeating ambivalent theme in the 
dialogue: relative value in division by form 
 As a necessary condition for the possibility of all art, metrion, 
due measure, is axiological. That weaving or statecraft or any other 
art must measure various species of more and less by reference to 
a standard of what is just right and ftting introduces criteria by which 
the products of the art can be evaluated as better or worse. This 
provides an indication why due measure is essential to all technê  
A technê produces a product, the quality of which can be evaluated 
in accordance with the standards of the art. Furthermore, insofar as 
division itself is an art – in the Phaedrus Socrates will call it the 
art of dialectic (200c, 276e ff.) – it would follow that proper divi-
sion could be pursued only in accordance with due measure, which 
would have to mean in accordance with the true eidê  And insofar 
as division by forms means showing the difference between distinct 
kinds that resemble in some respect, and might therefore, if we are 
not careful, be confused and thought to be the same, division implic-
itly is at the same time evaluation. Examining resemblances means 
observing the respects in which things compared are similar and the 
degree of similarity, and the respect in which they differ and the de-
gree of difference  Precisely because resemblance is not symmetri-
cal – two things that symmetrically resembled each other perfectly in 
every respect would be copies of each other, not one the resemblance 
of the other, as Plato likes to point out, e.g., in the Cratylus, but also 
12 It should be noted that, short as it is, the division contradicts the Eleatic 
Visitor’s earlier remark: insofar as due measure is principle of all art (284a), 
there are no arts that employ only relative measurement 
tice,” but the greater topic of the statesman is not independently in-
vestigated after having some practice; it is expressly modeled after 
the weaving analogue. The Visitor seems to have it in mind in ad-
vance: even if he treats weaving as a chance example, he also selects 
weaving because he thinks it somehow to deal with the same sorts 
of affairs as the political art (echon tên autên politikê pragmateian, 
279a). Weaving will provide a rich and vivid metaphor for the fnal 
passages, and it is an important metaphor elsewhere in Plato, but the 
expressed conception of the function of paradigms is problematic.
 Before its application to the continued search for the political art, 
the Visitor uses his discussion of the weaving paradigm to introduce 
in an offhand way remarks on the art of measurement. The claim that, 
for the very possibility of art, measuring cannot be only the relative 
measuring of greater compared with lesser, but must include meas-
urement against the standard of due or proper measure (metrion), is 
a striking one, both for the weight that the Eleatic Visitor gives to it, 
and for the peculiar manner in which the art of measurement and the 
use of the paradigm are juxtaposed.
 The introduction of the principle of due measure is signaled as 
a matter both essential and diffcult. The very existence of any art 
stands and falls with the existence of due measure. Moreover, our 
acknowledgement of the existence of due measure must be forced 
(prosanagkasteon, 284b). The Eleatic Visitor implies that the entire 
argument of the whole dialogue is at stake over this, by stating that 
the task of establishing the principle of due measure is comparable 
to the previous day’s need to forcibly introduce some sense in which 
not-being can be said to exist, which was required in order to es-
tablish the possibility of the image and to defne the sophist (284c), 
and moreover, the Visitor continues, to establish the principle of due 
measure is an even greater labor 
 This exaggerated earnestness of the Visitor’s description plays up 
the irony of what the Visitor in fact does. The paradigm of weaving, 
having just been explicated through divisions of the greatest detail 
and greatest length – far more detail than any other piece of divid-
ing in the dialogue – gives way to defning what is called the most 
important and most diffcult matter of all, the art of measurement, 
the defnition of which is taken up and completed in the shortest di-
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into similar sub–kinds lies, for example, in the inferior and defcient 
resemblance that one has for the other  And insofar as the principle 
of measure implies that differentiation in value is intrinsic to com-
plete division by forms, the principle of value neutrality is inconsist-
ent with the principle that is a necessary condition for all art 
 The principle of the paradigm – specifcally the paradigm as it is 
deployed by the Eleatic Visitor – conficts with the principle of meas-
ure by reinforcing a commitment to value neutrality. This occurs, 
not because it is a paradigm in the sense of a model or analogy – 
weaving, after all, makes for a delightful metaphor – but because 
the notion of how to conceive and apply a paradigm, works to fat-
ten the graded landscape of resemblances  It does this by proposing 
that what is prior be explicated through that which is derivative and 
inferior. The Eleatic Visitor, who in the Sophist struggles to con-
ceptualize the image in its asymmetry as something that is real but 
not as real as that which it is an image of and with respect to which 
it is derivative, now faces analogous obstacles to locate the human 
being 
IV. Somewhere between Pigs and Gods
The confict of antithetical principles for dividing plays out in the f-
nal depictions of the human condition and the possibilities for human 
political life: alternately demarcated by shades of value, or devoid 
of differentiation, a world of societies governed by better or worse 
constitutions, or a world ruled only by sophists.
 The application of the weaving paradigm does little to clarify mat-
ters. Ostensibly, it addresses the lasting and remaining unresolved 
issue: the diffcult distinction of the king from others whose arts also 
pertain to care of the human herd. The lengthy analysis of weaving 
as distinct from carding, spinning, and other kindred arts supplies the 
concept of the secondary cause (sunaitia, 281c) to distinguish arts 
that may serve the people, but are subservient to the authority of the 
king. With this, weaving has contributed only a name. In effect, 
nearly the same distinction was drawn, albeit poorly drawn, at 260e, 
when autepitaktikê, giving one’s own orders, was separated from the 
nameless others, which at the time were not classifed, only indicated 
by several examples, such as the herald and prophet, examples that 
now reappear alongside additional categories of subservient arts. The 
in the Statesman – recognizing resemblance is always evaluative  
That is the case with division that distinguishes relative measure 
from measure against a standard 
 Differentiation by eidê, then, could not be blind to relative value. 
Nor is it in the Philebus, where it is asserted that if measure is only in 
terms of relative more and less, defnite quantity is abolished (24c–d) 
and that the highest possession is due measure and ftness, metrion 
and kairon (66a), which make possible all knowledge, art, and true 
belief (66b).13 We also fnd the subjects of division portrayed as 
having been analyzed and understood only when the resemblances 
of distinct kinds is displayed in terms of their relative value: pleasure 
and knowledge in the Philebus, left-handed and right-handed love 
in the Phaedrus, topics that, like statecraft, pertain to the exercise 
of wisdom in human affairs, the understanding of which requires 
a grasp of relative value 
 Such is also the case for the chain of subjects into which the states-
man falls, and our dialogue opens with Socrates making a joke about 
the proportionally relative values of the sophist, statesman, and phi-
losopher (257b). It is, signifcantly, Old Socrates’ sole contribution 
to the conversation 
 The Eleatic Visitor, in contrast, immediately upon establishing the 
close kinship associating pig and person, and therefore swineherd 
and humanherder, re-issues an instruction from the Sophist, 227b: the 
method of division is not concerned at all whether one part is more 
or less noble than another and does not esteem the smaller any less 
than the greater. Its sole concern is to reach the highest truth (266d). 
In one way the Visitor’s instruction is benign. It can be read as the 
injunction not to introduce any bias that would skew in advance the 
outcome of the division, as illustrated by the example of dividing 
Greeks from Barbarians. But it is then used to circumvent a division 
that will ultimately be drawn, only in a different way: human and 
animal, to be contrasted not in view of rationality, but rather by the 
number of feet. The Visitor’s instruction is not merely an innocuous 
caution against prejudice. Thus the injunction becomes problematic, 
should it happen to be true that the difference that divides a kind 
13 For detailed consideration of parallels to the Philebus cf. D. White, 
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need only to know, only to have epistêmê, not technê in the sense that 
was attributed to the political art when the principle of due measure 
was introduced: there it is epistêmê peri tas prakseis, knowledge 
concerning practical affairs 14
 Can the Eleatic Visitor allow then for a truly human political art? 
The concluding passages of the Statesman give some indication 
of just that, beginning to add elements of shading and coloring to 
the sketch that outlined human form. But there are two sketches. The 
Visitor remains caught in an ambiguity, the ambivalence of deciding 
between two sets of conficting rules for inquiry, of deciding whether 
the true ruler stands over and apart from the governed herd like the 
swineherd over his pigs or is nearer in nature and education to the 
society that the ruler organizes, and of deciding whether or not hu-
man affairs can be understood as something intermediate between 
divine activity and that sturdy and slovenly existence we imagine 
the pig enjoys.
 This ambivalence is most apparent where the Visitor tries to sepa-
rate the sophist from the true ruler  Once he introduces the sophist as 
a master of deception (megiston goêta) who is occupied with political 
affairs (ta tôn poleôn pragmata) and diffcult but necessary to distin-
guish from the true king, the Eleatic Visitor describes the fve types 
of constitution (291c). Yet the claim that the only correct rule is rule 
by epistêmê (292c) leads to the conclusion that there can be only one 
true constitution, not fve (293c) and any others are neither legitimate 
nor real (ou gnêsias oud’ ontôs ousas, 293e). The envisioned inter-
mediate of a political science as a practical art, an epistêmê peri tas 
14 This ambivalence was introduced at the outset with the peculiar man-
ner in which practical knowledge was divided from theoretical (258e). On 
the reading defended here, that ambiguity is neither to be resolved as an ex-
planation of the relation of theory to practice that mirrors the relation of soul 
to body (see Xavier Marquez, Theory and Practice in Plato’s Statesman, 
in: Ancient Philosophy, 27, 2007, pp. 31–53), nor is it a residual ambiguity 
inherent in the Platonic conception of democracy (see D. Roochnik, Residual 
Ambiguity in Plato’s Statesman, in: Plato: The Internet Journal of the Inter-
national Plato Society, 5, 2005) . Rather, the ambivalence – illustrated by the 
dual cosmic ages of the myth – is rooted in the Eleatic Visitor’s diffculties 
to conceive of an intermediate that resembles divine truth but is not identical 
to it 
real issue, however, is not how to make clear and intelligible the dif-
ference between king and herald, or even king and general. In fact, 
most of the so-called contenders for the title of ruler turn out not to 
be contenders at all. Rather, it is the issue raised by Socrates at the 
start of the Sophist, the issue that instigated the whole conversation, 
namely, how to distinguish the sophist from the statesman.
 The fgure of the sophist is compared at once to a ferce beast 
like the Centaur and to a weak yet cunning one like the Satyr in 
passages that frst introduce and then conclude the discussion of his 
problematic separation from the statesman (291a–303d). The fgure 
of the sophist brackets an ambivalent discussion about the legitimacy 
of governments 
 The ambivalence is a product of the ambivalence over values that 
has emerged from the conficting principles. Twice, distinct forms 
of political organization are distinguished and their relative legiti-
macy taken up, and twice the distinctions are collapsed and rejected. 
This occurs against the background of qualities defning the one true 
king: the kingly art is a kind of knowledge (epistêmê, 292a); there-
fore rule in accordance with that knowledge is the sole criterion for 
defning true government (and all other factors, whether the society 
is wealthy or impoverished, the people willing subjects or compelled, 
etc. are irrelevant); therefore there can be only one form of true con-
stitution, namely rule by the person possessing knowledge of the 
kingly art (293c); the true ruler would not rule by laws (294a); except 
as a second best and necessary alternative, like the doctor who leaves 
written instructions for his patients to follow in his absence (295c); 
the true ruler makes no errors; the true ruler only rules and does not 
act (305d).
 These characteristics, it becomes clear, describe no existing gov-
ernment of humans by humans; rather, as the metaphor of the phy-
sician leaving orders and then withdrawing makes evident, the de-
scription corresponds most closely to rule under the divine shepherd 
in the age of Kronos. The human condition in the age of Kronos 
was a different one. Those humans had no need to farm, to work, to 
build shelter; all were tame and there was no strife or war; there was 
no need for sex and so no occasion for any accompanying conficts, 
jealousies, families and other complications. In short, there is neither 
social organization, nor a need for it: the divine shepherd rules, but 




Pigs in Plato: Delineating the Human Condition in the Statesman
an image, an intermediate in time, that at all times can potentially 
become better or worse than it actually is 
 To the extent that the Visitor is still tied to Eleatic metaphysics, for 
which anything that is, simply is, he remains at a loss how to accom-
modate the intermediate, which had presented him with a theoreti-
cal obstacle in the Sophist in the image, and now in the Statesman 
a practical and living obstacle in the human condition 
 The ambivalence in the Statesman’s concluding exchanges may 
lead some to fnd a message of pessimism, the message that true 
statesmanship is unattainable, leaving us – in the absence of some di-
vine caretaker, who herds humans as human raise pigs – condemned 
to rule as and be ruled by sophists. But these strains do not conceal 
a rather more optimistic view of the human condition. The Visitor’s 
astonishment that some existing governments do show some degree 
of stability indicates that the limits of his metaphysics fail to ad-
equately account for experience. The fact that not all human states-
men in the age of Zeus are mere sophists shows that there is after all 
a distinction to be made between statesman and sophist that is not 
purely a theoretical defnition without counterpart on earth. If the 
limitations of the Eleatic Visitor’s metaphysics allow for no interme-
diate between what absolutely is and what is not at all, then there is 
no allowance for an epistemê that is also a technê, for a technê that 
seeks to apply due measure, realized at times better, at times worse. 
The Visitor is then left with no way to conceptualize genuine rule, 
expect as purely theoretical, a pure epistemê in an age of Kronos 
where there is no technê 
 The Eleatic Visitor’s dilemma presents us with a choice, and just 
perhaps it suggests that our metaphysical choices are at the same 
time very practical choices, since it is also a choice about our self-
understanding. The dilemma brings us back to the dialogue’s frst 
traces of our lineage among our fellow animals  If the only possible 
rule of humans by humans is sophistry, then, whatever other arts 
may exist, there would be no possibility for political art in this age 
of Zeus, and we might as well resign ourselves to race along through 
life like our suilline sisters and brothers, in the words of the Repub-
lic, wallowing carefree in our ignorance like a pig in the mud (eux-
erôs hôsper thêrion hueion en amathia molunêtai, VII,535e). Then 
again, if we think clearly and choose well, this, evidently, is not the 
only possibility. After all, to slightly adapt Socrates’ citation of the 
prakseis, is replaced by reverting to a vision of pure epistêmê unsul-
lied by practicalities on the model of divine rule 
 And then again this conclusion (293e) that appears to reject the 
reality of existing political forms is immediately qualifed: if not real 
or legitimate, they must be imitations, and the well-ordered ones (eu-
nomous) imitate better, the more disordered, worse (293e). However, 
this qualifcation that has reintroduced the recognition of better and 
worse in human affairs is once more obliterated with the subsequent 
conclusion that no form of imitation can be endowed with any degree 
of epistêmê (300d–e: Ar’ oun ei men anepistêmones ontes to toiou-
ton drôen, mimeisthai men an epicheiroien to alêthes, mimoint’ an 
mentoi pankakôs· ei d’ entechnoi, touto ouk esti mimêma, all’ auto 
to alêthestaton ekeino;).15
 And then once more, responding to his own astonishment that there 
is after all some degree of stability in some existing cities (302a), 
the Eleatic Visitor once again lays out forms of constitution,16 and 
ranks them better to worse (302e – 303b), then immediately fattens 
the gradation with the assertion that all these constitutions and any 
others except the true state are imitations perpetuated by the most 
sophistical of sophists (megistous tôn sophistôn sophistas, 303c).
 The Eleatic Visitor recognizes that an art of politics, as contrasted 
with the purely theoretical knowledge of the intelligible good, must 
apply that good as far as possible to practical affairs  An art of poli-
tics, one that is not simply herd management, must recognize the 
due measure of its art, the kairos, or, to borrow an apt phrase from 
Melissa Lane, the good in time.17
 For there to exist a kairos or any sort of due measure requires that 
we be able to bring knowable principles to bear on that which can 
represent but never match the principle that it imitates. It requires 
15 The Visitor’s inference is justifed by the analogies to the ship and 
medicine, envisioning a democratic rule by lot, a kind of rule by sophists that 
destroys and banishes all art, at 298a–300a. It recalls the eventual (unsuccess-
ful) account of images in the Sophist by dividing image making into eikastikê 
and phantastikê, images that are true and images that are false, leaving no 
space for conceptualizing the image as the intermediate that was intended 
16 This time six instead of fve, now dividing democracy into two.







proverb in the Laches, politikê is not the kind of thing just any pig 
would know (Lach. 196d: kata tên paroimian ara tô onti ouk an pasa 
hus gnoiê).
